The Oxford Handbook of Lying

This handbook brings together past and current research on all aspects of lying and deception, with chapters contributed by leading international experts in the field. We are confronted daily with cases of lying, deception, bullshitting, and 'fake news', making it imperative to understand how lying works, how it can be defined, and whether it can be detected. A further important issue is whether lying should always be considered a bad thing or if, in some cases, itis simply a useful instrument of human cognition. This volume is the first to offer a comprehensive and up-to-date exploration of these and other issues from the combined perspectives of linguistics, philosophy, and psychology. Chapters offer precise definitions of lying and its subtypes, and outlinethe range of fields in which lying and deception play a role, from empirical lie detection and the acquisition of lying to its role in fiction, metaphor, and humour. They also describe the tools and approaches that are used by scholars researching lying and deception, such as questionnaire studies, EEG, neuroimaging, and the polygraph.The volume will be an essential reference for students and researchers in a range of fields who are looking to deepen their understanding of all aspects of lying and deception, and will contribute to establishing the vibrant new field of interdisciplinary lying research.

1 Jorg Meibauer: Introduction: What is lying?; Part I: Traditions; 2 James Edwin Mahon: Classic philosophical approaches to lying and deception; 3 James Edwin Mahon: Contemporary approaches to the philosophy of lying; 4 Karol J. Hardin: Linguistic approaches to lying and deception; 5 Lewis Bott and Emma Williams: Psycholinguistic approaches to lying and deception; 6 Alexa Decker, Amanda Disney, Brianna D'Elia, and Julian Paul Keenan: Lying, deception, and the brain; Part II: Concepts; 7 Stephen Wright: Lying and truth; 8 Mark Jary: Lying and assertion; 9 Matthew Benton: Lying, belief, and knowledge; 10 Andreas Stokke: Lying, sincerity, and quality; 11 Swati Gupta and Andrew Ortony: Lying and deception; 12 Neri Marsili: Lying and certainty; 13 Don Fallis: Lying and omissions; 14 Jorg Meibauer: Lying, implicating, and presupposing; 15 Kathi Beier: Lying and self-deception; 16 Eliot Michaelson: Lying, testimony, and epistemic vigilance; Part III: Types of lies and deception; 17 Julia Staffel: Knowledge lies and group lies; 18 Jennifer Lackey: Selfless assertions; 19 Jorg Meibauer: Bald-faced lies; 20 Andreas Stokke: Bullshitting; 21 Jennifer Perillo: Bluffing; 22 Simone Dietz: White and prosocial lies; Part IV: Distinctions; 23 Emar Maier: Lying and fiction; 24 Matthew McGlone and Max Baryshevtsev: Lying and quotation; 25 Marta Dynel: Lying and humour; 26 Rachel Giora: Lying, irony, and default interpretation; 27 Paul Egre and Benjamin Icard: Lying and vagueness; 28 Claudia Claridge: Lying, metaphor, and hyperbole; 29 Marina Terkourafi: Lying and politeness; Part V: Domains; 30 Victoria Talwar: Development of lying and cognitive abilities; 31 Samantha Mann: Lying and lie detection; 32 Kees van Deemter and Ehud Reiter: Lying and computational linguistics; 33 Bella M. DePaulo: Lying in social psychology; 34 Matthias Gamer and Kristina Suchotzki: Lying and psychology; 35 Giorgio Ganis: Lying and neuroscience; 36 Thomas L. Carson: Lying and ethics; 37 Stuart P. Green: Lying and the law; 38 Marta Serra-Garcia: Lying in economy; 39 Anita E. Kelly: Lying and education; 40 Dariusz Galasiński: Lying and discourse analysis; 41 Piers Robinson, David Miller, Eric Herring, and Vian Bakir: Lying and politics; 42 Thomas L. Carson: Lying and history; 43 Bettina Kummerling-Meibauer: Lying and the arts; 44 Fumiko Nishimura: Lying in different cultures